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SOVEREIGN IMPUNITY: THE "UNIFORM LAWS"
THEORY TRIES (AND FAILS) TO TAKE A
BANKRUPTCY-SIZED BITE OUT OF THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT
Cecily Fuhr
Abstract: Sovereign immunity represents the principle that a state cannot be subjected to
suit without its consent. In bankruptcy proceedings, it is sometimes necessary for a debtor to
file an adversary proceeding against a creditor to determine the dischargeability of a debt.
When the creditor is a state, the exercise of sovereign immunity by that state can pose an
obstacle to the total discharge of debts contemplated by the bankruptcy system. Courts have
found unconstitutional recent attempts by Congress to abrogate states' sovereignty in § 106(a)
of the Bankruptcy Code. In response, some courts have adopted a "uniform laws" theory. This
theory suggests that states waived their sovereign immunity in the bankruptcy realm when
they ratified the Constitution. However, sovereign immunity is a vital part of the nation's
constitutional structure, and the arguments advanced by the "uniform laws" theory in favor of
an original waiver of sovereign immunity are not sufficiently compelling to justify
abandoning such an important principle. The theory that bankruptcy proceedings should be
exempt from sovereign immunity under the "uniform laws" clause of Article I runs contrary
to essential principles of federalism and state sovereignty and should be abandoned.
Sovereign immunity stands for the principle that states cannot be
subjected to suit without their consent. The Supreme Court has held that,
although sovereign immunity is implicit in the structure of the
Constitution, the principles on which that immunity is based were re-
expressed and reaffirmed by the passage of the Eleventh Amendment.1
Recent Supreme Court cases have clarified and strengthened the power
of sovereign immunity, strictly limiting Congress's power to abrogate the
exercise of sovereign immunity by states, and curtailing courts' ability to
find that a state has waived its immunity in a given case.2
Federal bankruptcy law fulfills an important function in the economic
and social life of the nation. By submitting their estate and their
1. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,713 (1999).
2. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. ofAla. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (examining Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,111-12,117 (1990)); Kimel v. Ma. Bd. of Regents, 528
U.S. 62 (2000) (examining Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(a)(1) (1967)); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (examining Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 (FISA), Pub. L No. 75-718, 52 Stat 1060 (1994)); Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (examining Trademark Remedy
Classification Act (TRCA), Pub. L No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567 (1999)); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (examining Patent and Plant Variety
Protection Remedy Clarification Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a) (1992)).
Washington Law Review
creditors' claims to a bankruptcy court, overwhelmed debtors can take
care of their debts and obtain a fresh start.3 The bankruptcy court's
oversight of the process benefits debtors by protecting them from
creditors' pressure, and by ensuring that debts, once discharged, will not
be revived again to haunt the debtor's future life.' The bankruptcy system
also benefits creditors by ensuring that the debtor's remaining resources
are distributed fairly between all parties, and by moving the process
along to a swift resolution that minimizes the expense and trouble of
litigation.'
Sovereign immunity presents a number of challenges to the
bankruptcy process when asserted by a state against a debtor in an
adversary proceeding. A debtor who is unable to have state debts
discharged may lose part of the advantage of bankruptcy's fresh start.6
Furthermore, full payment of all debts to the state may leave very little of
the debtor's estate available to other creditors! Finally, a state's decision
to opt out of the bankruptcy process may delay the expeditious resolution
of the process, frustrating one of the primary advantages of the
bankruptcy process.
However, recent Supreme Court decisions on state sovereign
immunity have made it clear that state sovereign immunity is an integral
part of the nation's constitutional structure that cannot be lightly
abrogated.9 The tensions between state and federal power are carefully
balanced by the Constitution, and the right to invoke sovereign immunity
in the face of suit deserves the same stringent protections as other
constitutional rights.' ° As a result, any legal theory purporting to find that
states have waived their immunity must pass through the constitutional
safeguards established by the Court.
3. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279,286 (1991).
4. See, e.g., Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915) (noting that the
purpose of federal bankruptcy law is to "relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive
indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent
upon business misfortunes").
5. See Laura B. Bartell, Getting to Waiver: A Legislative Solution to State Sovereign Immunity in
Bankruptcy After Seminole Tribe, 17 BANKR. DECV. J. 17,55-56 (2000).
6. See Grogan, 498 U.S. at 287.
7. See Bartell, supra note 5, at 43-44.
8. See id. at 55.
9. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,715 (1999).
10. See Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 682
(1999).
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Some courts, looking for ways to circumvent sovereign immunity in
order to further the important purposes of the bankruptcy system, have
adopted a "uniform laws" theory that they believe exempts bankruptcy
proceedings from the power of states' immunity." Courts adopting the
"uniform laws" theory argue that the framers of the Constitution did not
contemplate that states would retain their immunity in bankruptcy upon
ratification. 2 These courts point to Alexander Hamilton's Federalist
Nos. 81 and 3213 for the proposition that the Constitution limits state
sovereignty in bankruptcy and conclude that these limitations on
sovereignty also apply to states' sovereign immunity.
However, this theory is profoundly flawed. It ignores the precedential
force of Supreme Court decisions concerning the Eleventh Amendment,
and fails to recognize the large number of circuit courts that have
considered and rejected such a theory.'4 The theory itself is based on a
fundamental confusion between "sovereignty" and "sovereign
immunity," and incorrectly asserts that Hamilton's comments on the
former necessarily apply to the latter." Finally, the theory places undue
emphasis on the requirement of "uniform laws" in the Bankruptcy Clause
of the Constitution. 6 Uniformity can be achieved through geographical
uniformity, which allows for the assertion of sovereign immunity and the
protection of vital federalist principles.17
Part I of this Comment examines the underpinnings of sovereign
immunity through the history and judicial interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment. Part 11 lays out the policies and procedures of the
bankruptcy system and discusses some of the special difficulties that
sovereign immunity poses in the bankruptcy context. Part IR looks at
previous legislative and judicial attempts to address these difficulties and
why those attempts have generally failed to solve the problem. Part IV
describes the recently developed "uniform laws" theory, which attempts
to remove the sovereign immunity issue from bankruptcy proceedings
through a novel interpretation of the Constitution's Bankruptcy Clause.
11. See Hood v. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. (In re Hood), 262 B.R. 412,418 (6th Cir. B.A.P.
2001); Bliemeister v. Indus. Comm'n of Ariz. (In re Bliemeister), 251 B.IL 383, 389 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 2000).
12. See In re Hood, 262 B.R. at 418; In re Bliemeister, 251 B.R. at 389.
13. ALEXANDER HAMILTON ET AL., THE FEDERALIST (Modem Library ed. 1937).
14. See infra Section V.A.
15. See infra Section V.B.
16. U.S. CONST. art. L § 8, ci. 4.
17. See infra Section V.C.
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Part V argues that the tenuous connections made by the "uniform laws"
theory between the Constitution and the Federalist Papers ignore
binding precedent, represent an error in legal reasoning, and fail to
recognize that even the most pressing policy considerations must bow to
the basic federalist structures that underlie our political structure. This
Comment concludes that the bankruptcy system must accept and
incorporate states' sovereign immunity as a part of its underlying plan.
I. THE CURRENT DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IS
THE PRODUCT OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND ITS
JUDICIAL EXPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION
Sovereign immunity is the principle that states are immune to suit by
individuals. The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution codifies that
principle to a limited extent. 8 Since its passage, however, the Supreme
Court has interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to apply more broadly
than its text suggests, creating what has been referred to as the "other"
Eleventh Amendment.' 9 In the last six years, the Court has strictly
limited Congress's ability to abrogate states' sovereign immunity.
20
Furthermore, although states may voluntarily waive their immunity, the
Court has required that the waiver be explicit and unmistakable. 2'
A. Congress Passed the Eleventh Amendment in Response to Chisholm
v. Georgia
The Eleventh Amendment reads as follows: "The Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
18. U.S. CONST. amend. X1.
19. See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 53 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring);
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 124-25 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
20. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (examining ADA, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12,111-12,117 (1990)); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (examining
ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1967)); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (examining FLSA,
Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1994)); Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (examining TRCA, Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567 (1999));
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (examining
Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a) (1992)).
21. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 675-76.
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State."' Congress crafted the Amendment as a direct response to the
Supreme Court's 1793 decision in Chisholm v. Georgia,23 which
extended the Court's judicial power to a dispute over Georgia's Civil
War debts.2' State legislatures were shocked by the Court's decision,
seeing it as a serious assault on states' sovereign immunity rights.' In
response, Congress introduced the Eleventh Amendment in order to
prevent any further erosion of the states' independence.26
In Chisholm, the Court held that states could be subjected to federal
courts' Article EI jurisdiction when sued by citizens of other states.27
Robert Farquahar, a South Carolina native, had sold vital war materials
to the State of Georgia during the Revolutionary War, but Georgia
neglected to pay for the supplies.2 ' Farquahar's executor, Alexander
Chisholm, sued to recover the money owed to his estate.29 Chisholm filed
his action against Georgia in the U.S. Supreme Court, invoking its
original Article I jurisdiction over "all cases.., in which a State shall
be Party."'3 The Court acknowledged its jurisdiction, holding that the
Constitution extends the judicial power of the United States to disputes
over the debts of individual states, and that the Supreme Court therefore
had jurisdiction over Chisholm's assumpsit action.31 As a result, the
Court ordered that the state of Georgia be issued a summons to either
appear or risk a default judgment against it.32
The decision in Chisholm sparked immediate controversy.
Newspapers of the time loudly protested what they saw as an unexpected
violation of state sovereignty that could produce widespread raids on
state treasuries.33 State legislatures immediately swung into action: the
Massachusetts Legislature deemed the decision "repugnant to the first
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
23. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1792).
24. Id. at 465-66.
25. Alden, 527 U.S. at 720.
26. Id. at 723.
27. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) at 466.
28. JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 12(1987).
29. Id.
30. U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 2, cl. 2; Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 426.
31. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 465.
32. Id. at479.
33. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 720 (1999) (citing D. CURIE, THE CONSTITION IN
CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789-1801 196 (1997)).
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principles of a federal government" and urged the state's federal
representatives to modify the Constitution in order to prevent such
suits.34 In Georgia, public feeling ran even higher, and the State House of
Representatives passed a bill providing that anyone attempting to enforce
the Supreme Court's decision would be "guilty of felony and.., suffer
death, without benefit of clergy, by being hanged."
3 5
Congress moved quickly to address the assault on state sovereignty by
proposing a constitutional amendment. On the day after the Chisholm
decision became public, the House of Representatives introduced the
proposed amendment, intended to overrule the Supreme Court's holding
and restore states' immunity to suit.36 Within a mere two months, both
the House and the Senate had approved a proposal and sent it to the
states for ratification.37 Debate over the amendment had lasted only a
single day in each house,38 and the language was approved almost
unanimously: 23-2 in the Senate, and 81-9 in the House.39 The states
ratified the final version in 1795, only five years after the Chisholm
decision.4" The Eleventh Amendment was finally incorporated into the
Constitution in 1798.41
B. Judicial Interpretation Has Created the "Other" Eleventh
Amendment, Which Extends Beyond the Plain Text of the
Constitution
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity is a complex doctrine,
shaped not only by the plain text of the Constitution but also by a series
of Supreme Court decisions which have created what is generally
referred to as the "other" Eleventh Amendment. Based on its plain text
alone, the Amendment would seem to limit states' immunity only to suits
by citizens of other states. However, the Supreme Court has emphasized
that the underlying principle of sovereign immunity is far broader than
the Eleventh Amendment language, on its face, would indicate. As a
34. Id. (citing 15 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 314 (H. Syrett & J. Cooke eds., 1969)).
35. Id. at 720-21 (citing CURRIE, supra note 33, at 196).
36. Id. at 721 (citing CURRIE, supra note 33, at 196).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. ORTH, supra note 28, at 20.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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result, states' immunity extends to cases filed by their own citizens as
well.
The plain text of the Amendment limits states' immunity from suit
only in cases where the plaintiff is an out-of-state citizen.42 It was
specifically designed to overrule the Chisholm decision43 and would, on
its face, seem to apply only to that particular set of facts. If this were the
case, states would be immune from suits initiated by citizens of other
states, but not from suits by their own citizens.
However, the Supreme Court has held that states' immunity is a
fundamental aspect of the traditional sovereignty they enjoyed before the
ratification of the U.S. Constitution.' Because the immunity of the
sovereign can traditionally only be waived by that sovereign's consent,
any limitations on a state's sovereignty can only exist as a result of that
state's consent to such limitations.45 In ratifying the Constitution, the
states consented to certain suits, including those brought by other states
or by the Federal Government, but states retained sovereign immunity in
all other areas.46
Therefore, the Supreme Court has also held that states retain sovereign
immunity when sued by their own citizens. Hans v. Louisiana47 was the
first case in which the Supreme Court held that sovereign immunity
extends beyond the plain language of the Eleventh Amendment. In Hans,
a resident of Louisiana brought a suit against his home state in federal
court under federal question jurisdiction when the state breached its
obligation to pay interest on a bond.48 Although the Eleventh
Amendment only eliminates jurisdiction for suits against states by out-
of-state citizens, the Court nevertheless unanimously held that the
fundamental principle of sovereign immunity also prevented states from
being sued by their own citizens without the state's consent.49 This
expansive view of immunity-which has come to be called the "other"
42. Id. ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State... ."').
43. Alden, 527 U.S. at 723.
44. Id. at 713.
45. Id. at 755.
46. Id.
47. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
48. Id. at 1.
49. Id. at 17.
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Eleventh Amendment°--continued to be followed in Ex parte New
York,"' where the Court held that a non-consenting state was immune
from suit in an admiralty action. 2
The Court has emphasized the importance and power of the "other"
Eleventh Amendment in recent years. Over the last decade, Congress has
frequently attempted to bring states into the sphere of its legislative
power by enacting various statutory schemes that attempt to abrogate
states' sovereign immunity.53 However, a series of recent Supreme Court
decisions has sharply limited the circumstances under which abrogation
might occur.
C. In Recent Years, the Supreme Court Has Limited Congress's Ability
To Abrogate States' Sovereign Immunity
Under certain circumstances, Congress has the power to abrogate
states' sovereign immunity through legislation, as long as it clearly and
unmistakably expresses its intent and acts in a constitutional manner. 4
Prior to 1996, Congress could abrogate state sovereign immunity in
legislation passed pursuant to either Article I's Commerce Clause"5 or the
Fourteenth Amendment. 6 In 1996, however, the Court held in Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida57 that Congress could not abrogate states'
immunity under any of its Article I powers." Furthermore, in City of
Boerne v. Flores,59 decided in 1997, the Court sharply limited Congress's
ability to act under the Fourteenth Amendment.6" As a result, since 1997
50. See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 53 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring);
see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 124-25 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
51. 256 U.S. 490 (1921).
52. Id. at 497.
53. See, eg., Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h),
296(a) (1992); TRCA, Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567 (1999); FLSA, Pub. L No. 75-718, 52
Stat. 1060 (1994); ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1967); ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,111-12,117 (1990).
54. Seminole, 517 U.S. at 55-56.
55. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1989).
56. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,448 (1976).
57. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
58. Id. at 62-66.
59. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
60. Id. at 519.
Vol. 77:511, 2002
Sovereign Immunity in Bankruptcy
the Court has found a number of Congress's attempts at abrogation
unconstitutional under the standards of Seminole and City of Boerne.61
Prior to 1996, Congress had two potential ways to abrogate state
sovereign immunity. In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,6' the Court ruled
in a plurality opinion that Congress could abrogate a state's immunity
under its Article I power to regulate interstate commerce.63 The Court
also ruled in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer' that Congress could abrogate state
immunity if it was acting under the Fourteenth Amendment.65 The
Fourteenth Amendment embodies "significant limitations on state
authority,, 66 and expressly grants Congress the authority to enforce its
provisions by appropriate legislation.67 Consequently, the court held that
Congress may, in exercising its Fourteenth Amendment powers, provide
for suits against states that would be constitutionally impermissible in
other contexts.68
After Union Gas and Fitzpatrick, Congress wielded its authority to
eliminate states' immunity in many areas. Congress enacted a number of
statutes that contained similar provisions abrogating state sovereign
immunity within their statutory schemes. The range of affected statutes
was considerable, including intellectual property laws such as the Patent
and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, 9 civil rights laws
such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)70 and
61. See, eg., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. ofAla. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (examining ADA, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12,111-12,117 (1990)); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (examining
ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1967)); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (examining FLSA,
Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1994)); Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (examining TRCA, Pub. L No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567 (1999));
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (examining
Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a) (1992)).
62. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
63. U.S. CoNSr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing that Congress shall have the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce... among the several States"); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 13-14
(1989).
64.427 U.S. 445 (1976).
65. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.").
66. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a) (1992).
70. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1967).
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Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),7' and bankruptcy laws such as
§ 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.72
Only a few years after the Union Gas decision, however, the Court did
a sharp about-face, overruling Union Gas and putting stringent limits on
Congress's ability to abrogate state immunity in Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida73 and City of Boerne v. Flores.74 In Seminole, the
Seminole tribe sued the state of Florida under the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act (IGRA),75 which had been passed by Congress pursuant
to its Article I powers to regulate commerce with Indian tribes.76 Under
IGRA, states were obligated to negotiate in good faith with the tribes in
order to form a state-tribal compact governing gaming activities by the
tribe within the state. Congress had also authorized tribes to bring suit
against a state in federal court to compel it to negotiate in good faith.7
Alleging that the state and its governor had failed in their duty, the
Seminole tribe filed suit under IGRA's enforcement provisions.79
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the tribe's
suit in a 5-4 decision that limited Congress's ability to include
enforcement provisions against states when enacting Article I
legislation. 0 Seminole explicitly overruled Union Gas, holding that
Congress may not use its Article I powers to overcome the Eleventh
Amendment.8 ' The Court held that Article III, as shaped by the Eleventh
Amendment, represents the exclusive catalog of permissible federal
jurisdiction and that Congress could not expand the scope of that
jurisdiction through Article I legislation.82 As a result, concluded the
Court, Congress has no authority to abrogate states' sovereign immunity
under its Article I powers. 3 Although the Seminole decision reaffirmed
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,111-12,117 (1990).
72. 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (1994).
73. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
74. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
75. 25 U.S.C. § 2701-2721 (1988).
76. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (providing that Congress shall have the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce... with the Indian Tribes"); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47.
77. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 51-52.
80. Id. at 72-73.
81. Id. at66.
82. Id. at 64-65 (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1).
83. Id. at 73.
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Fitzpatrick's assertion that Congress could abrogate under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court noted that IGRA had been passed solely based on
Congress's Article I power to regulate relationships with the tribes, so
Fitzpatrick would not apply. 4
Only a year after eliminating Congress's ability to abrogate under
Article I, the Court tightened the scope of Fourteenth Amendment
abrogation authorized by Fitzpatrick in City of Boerne v. Flores." City of
Boerne created a number of safeguards to protect states' rights from
incursions by Congress. In order for any legislation under the Fourteenth
Amendment to be constitutional, the Court ruled, certain conditions must
be met. 6 First, the abrogation must be a remedial response to a pattern of
constitutional violations by the states," and the pattern should ideally be
laid out clearly in the legislative record. 8 Secondly, the remedial
legislation must be shaped with "congruence" and "proportionality" in
mind,89 responding to an actual or potential injury rather than creating
new substantive rights.9" As a result, City of Boerne's holding limits
Fitzpatrick's scope.9'
Consequently, Seminole Tribe and City of Boerne have become the
Scylla and Charybdis of Congressional abrogation. If the legislation is
passed under Article I, Congress's abrogation of state sovereign
immunity is absolutely unconstitutional; if it is passed under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the abrogation of immunity is unconstitutional
unless the stringent requirements of City of Boerne are met. Under the
standards set by Seminole and City of Boerne, the Supreme Court has
found a number of abrogation provisions in various statutes to be
unconstitutional.9' As a result, Congress's ability to abrogate state
sovereign immunity has been sharply curtailed since 1997.
84. Id. at 60.
85. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
86. Id. at 520.
87. Id. at 526.
88. Id. at 530.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 520.
91. Id. at518-19.
92. See, eg., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (examining
ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,111-12,117 (1990)); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62,91-92 (2000)
(examining ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1967)); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 759-60 (1999)
(examining FLSA, Pub. L No. 75-718, 52 Stat 1060 (1994)); Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 691 (1999) (examining TRCA, Pub. L. No. 102-
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D. States May Waive Their Sovereign Immunity but Must Do So
Expressly
States' sovereign immunity can be disposed of through a knowing,
voluntary waiver on the part of the state. Sovereign immunity is a
privilege personal to the sovereign and may be waived at the sovereign's
pleasure.93 In some cases, state legislatures may pass laws expressly
committing the state to a waiver of immunity in certain kinds of suits; for
example, by passing legislation subjecting themselves to some tort suits
by their own citizens."
Even if a state has not passed legislation acknowledging its consent to
suit, courts may find a state to have consented through its actions.95 For
example, courts may find that a state has waived its immunity if the state
has voluntarily invoked the jurisdiction of the court or if the state makes
a clear declaration that it intends to submit itself to the court's
jurisdiction.96 However, courts must use stringent standards to determine
whether a state has consented to suit.9
The degree to which the state's waiver must be clear and voluntary
has been set out recently by the Supreme Court in College Savings Bank
v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board,98 which
specifically examines the waiver doctrine in the context of Congress's
Article I powers. In an earlier decision, the Court had allowed a finding
of "implied" or "constructive" waiver of immunity by a state if it
voluntarily engaged in certain actions regulated by Congress, and under
the regulatory scheme Congress had required actors to consent to suit in
federal courts. 99 However, the Court in College Savings Bank explicitly
overruled this holding, finding the constructive waiver doctrine to be an
"ill conceived.., anomaly" lacking any merit."' Sovereign immunity,
the Court reasoned, is as fundamental a constitutional right as the right to
542, 106 Stat. 3567 (1999)); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 647-48 (1999) (examining Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act,
35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a) (1992)).
93. Clark v. Bamard, 108 U.S. 436,447-48 (1883).
94. See 57 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal, County, School, & State Tort Liability § 41 (2001).
95. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 675-76.
96. Id.
97. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985).
98. 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
99. Parden v. Terminal Ry. of the Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
100. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 680.
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trial by jury in criminal cases and must be protected with equal care.'
As a result, a state is deemed to have waived its immunity only when its
waiver is stated "by the most express language or by such overwhelming
implication... as will leave no room for any other reasonable
construction."' 2 A showing of anything less is inadequate to justify
infringing on a state's sovereign rights.
1I. THE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES OF BANKRUPTCY AND
THE IMPACT OF A STATE'S ASSERTION OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY
Sovereign immunity presents certain difficulties in the bankruptcy
context. In a bankruptcy proceeding, most debts are discharged once the
trustee distributes the assets of the debtor. However, certain debts that
are owed to the state have a special status and cannot be discharged
unless a debtor files an adversary proceeding against the state and
obtains a court ruling. In such a scenario, a state may assert sovereign
immunity, leaving the debtor still owing those debts even after having
completed the bankruptcy process. Such results can frustrate some of the
policies underlying the bankruptcy system.
A. Procedure in Bankruptcy Proceedings: Discharging Private Debts
The majority of bankruptcy cases that are aimed at discharging debts
follow a particular pattern. Generally, the bankruptcy process begins
when the debtor files a petition with the bankruptcy court.103 A
bankruptcy trustee is appointed, who proceeds to collect the property of
the bankruptcy estate from the debtor.' 4 Certain assets of individual
debtors may be claimed as "exempt" and retained by the debtor.' 5 In a
typical Chapter 7 consumer case, most of the debtor's assets will be
exempt, and there will be nothing for the trustee to collect.'06 Such cases
are referred to as "no asset" cases.0 7 Once the property, if any, has been
101. Id. at 682.
102. Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 239-40 (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 9 (1993).
104. Id. at 10.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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collected, the trustee liquidates the estate's assets and distributes them on
a pro rata basis to creditors. 8 After the distribution, the debtor generally
receives a discharge and exits from the process freed of the burden of
debts. 9 Although most debts will be readily discharged, § 523 of the
Bankruptcy Code exempts certain special kinds of debts from the
operation of any discharge."0
B. The Special Status of Certain Public Debts Means That Many Debts
Owed to a State Are Not Automatically Discharged
Sovereign immunity can be invoked by the processing of certain types
of debts in bankruptcy, when those debts are owed to a state or state
agency. Generally speaking, debts in a bankruptcy action are discharged
once the bankruptcy trustee has distributed the assets of the debtor, if any
exist."' However, certain kinds of debts have a special status and are not
routinely discharged, including student loans,"' child support and
alimony,"' and certain taxes."' Such debts may remain even after all
other liabilities of the debtor have been dealt with.
Under some circumstances, a debtor may need to file an adversary
proceeding against a state creditor. A debtor may wish to settle the issue
of whether a particular tax debt to a state falls into a non-dischargeable
category, and must file suit against the state in bankruptcy court in order
to obtain a final ruling."5 If the debt in question is an educational loan,
there is a presumption of non-dischargeability, and the debtor's only
chance to discharge such a loan is to file an adversary proceeding
requesting the court to grant a hardship discharge." 6
Congress has determined that vital policy interests are best served by
making certain debts more difficult to discharge. For example, Congress
created the federal student loan program to help Americans advance their
108. Id. at 10-11.
109. Id. at 11.
I10. Id.
111. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1994).
112. Id. § 523(a)(8).
113. Id. § 523(a)(5).
114. Id. § 523(a)(1).
115. See, e.g., Bliemeister v. Indus. Comm'n of Ariz. (In re Bliemeister), 251 B.R. 383, 385
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 2000).
116. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
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education, ensuring that no American would have to forego higher
education for financial reasons.1 7 By making student loans more difficult
to discharge, Congress strengthens the fiscal soundness of the loan
program and prevents debtors from taking advantage of the system."'
The bankruptcy process allows Congress to weigh the relative
importance of different debts and adjust bankruptcy procedures
accordingly, with an eye to supporting important national policies that
arise outside of the bankruptcy context.
C. Because a Debtor Must Sue the State To Determine the
Dischargeability of Certain Debts, These Suits Can Raise Difficult
Sovereign Immunity Issues and Threaten Important Bankruptcy
Policies
Filing an adversary proceeding against a state triggers sovereign
immunity issues. Such proceedings are considered "suits" within the
meaning of the Eleventh Amendment." 9 As a result, states are able to
assert sovereign immunity as a defense against the initiation of such
discharge proceedings and thus "opt out" of the entire bankruptcy
process if they so choose. If they do so, these types of debts owed to the
public purse will remain intact even though the debtor's other debts have
been entirely discharged.
Congress has been concerned that an assertion of sovereign immunity
can frustrate some of the policies that underlie the bankruptcy system. A
debtor who cannot discharge state debts will not enjoy the advantage of
bankruptcy's fresh start."20 Full payment of all debts to the state may
leave very little of the debtor's estate available to other creditors,
preventing a fully equitable settlement of the estate.' Finally, a state's
decision to opt out of the bankruptcy process might delay the expeditious
117. Roger Roots, The Student Loan Debt Crisis: A Lesson in Unintended Consequences, 29 Sw.
U. L REV. 501,505 (2000).
118. See In re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d 737, 743 (3d Cir. 1993) (describing the legislative history of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978).
119. Adversary proceedings involve service ofprocess, which hales the state into court; therefore,
most courts have found them to be "suits." See, e-g., Mitchell v. Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Mitchell),
209 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 2000); Maryland v. Antonelli Creditors' Liquidating Trust, 123 F.3d
777,786-87 (4th Cir. 1997).
120. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 282 (1991).
121. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531,563 (1994).
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resolution of competing claims, frustrating one of the primary advantages
of the bankruptcy process.
22
III. CONGRESS HAS ATTEMPTED TO ABROGATE SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY IN BANKRUPTCY LAW, BUT HAS FAILED TO
DO SO CONSTITUTIONALLY
Concerned about the assertion of sovereign immunity in bankruptcy,
Congress has passed various statutory provisions, most recently § 106(a),
which attempt to abrogate states' immunity in bankruptcy proceedings."2
However, Seminole prevents Congress from abrogating immunity under
any of its Article I powers. Because § 106(a) is considered to have been
passed pursuant to Congress's Article I bankruptcy power, rather than
under the Fourteenth Amendment, most courts have held § 106(a) to be
unconstitutional. States themselves could voluntarily waive their
immunity, but they have little incentive to do so. As a result, sovereign
immunity continues to pose difficulties in the bankruptcy process.
A. Congress Has Attempted To Abrogate Sovereign Immunity in
Bankruptcy, But Most Courts Have Found These Attempts To Be
Unconstitutional
Congress has attempted to limit states' sovereign immunity in
bankruptcy by inserting various abrogation provisions into the
bankruptcy code, most recently with § 106(a). However, after Seminole,
Congress may not abrogate under any of its Article I powers. Moreover,
after City of Boerne, abrogation under the Fourteenth Amendment is
severely limited, and Congress has not met the requirements necessary to
show that § 106(a) was constitutionally permissible under the Fourteenth
Amendment. As a result, a majority of courts have held that § 106(a) is
unconstitutional and invalid.
In 1994, Congress revised the Bankruptcy Code in order to abrogate
state sovereign immunity in certain parts of the bankruptcy process. 24
An earlier attempt to statutorily abrogate sovereign immunity had been
ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court on the grounds that
122. See Bartell, supra note 5, at 55-56.
123. See supra note 53.
124. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 § 113, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994)
(codified at 11 U.S.C. § 106).
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Congress had not shown a sufficiently explicit intent to eliminate
sovereign immunity."z  The 1994 revision was certainly clear:
"Notwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity, sovereign
immunity is abrogated as to a governmental unit.'
' 26
However, this provision is not a constitutional use of Congress's
Article I powers. After Seminole, Congress may not abrogate state
immunity from suit under its Article I powers. Because Congress's
power to establish a national bankruptcy system comes from Article I, its
propagation of bankruptcy laws falls under the limitations placed on all
Article I powers by the Seminole decision. 28 As a result, a number of
circuit courts have looked at § 106(a) in light of these standards and
found it wanting. 29 Courts have ruled that, to the extent that § 106(a) has
been propagated pursuant to the bankruptcy power, it is invalid. 3'
Although Congress can successfully abrogate immunity under the
Fourteenth Amendment if it meets certain conditions, 3 ' most courts have
found it improbable that § 106(a) was, or even could be, passed pursuant
to Congress's powers under that Amendment.' The ability to discharge
debts in bankruptcy is not a "right" protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.' Even if the Court were to change direction entirely and
begin to view discharge as a protected right, Congress's legislation
would still have to pass muster under the analysis established by City of
Boerne.'34 Therefore, Congress must be acting in a remedial capacity in
response to a clear and well-documented pattern of constitutional
violations by the states. 3 ' However, there is no evidence that Congress
125. United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 37 (1992); Hoffman v. Conn. Dep't of
Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96, 101-02 (1989).
126. 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (1994).
127. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,73 (1996).
128. Id.
129. See, eg., Mitchell v. Franchise Tax Bdl. (In re Mitchell), 209 F.3d 1111, 1121 (9th Cir.
2000); Sacred Heart Hosp. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare (In re Sacred Heart Hosp.), 133 F.3d 237, 245
(3d Cir. 1998); Dep't of Transp. & Dev. v. PNL Asset Mgmt. Co. (In re Fernandez), 123 F.3d 241,
245 (5th Cir. 1997); Schlossberg v. Comptroller of Treasury (In re Creative Goldsmiths), 119 F.3d
1140, 1147 (4th Cir. 1997).
130. See eg., In re Mitchell, 209 F.3d at 1121.
131. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,520 (1997).
132. See. eg., In re Mitchell, 209 F.3d at 1119; In re Sacred Heart Hosp., 133 F.3d at 244-45; In
re Fernandez, 123 F.3d at 245.
133. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434,446-47 (1973).
134. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
135. Id.
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identified such a pattern when it passed § 106(a),' 36 or that it advanced
the provision as a proportional remedy to such violations. 3 7 In fact, there
is no indication that the 1994 Act was intended to address even an
"unarticulated, general violation" of individuals' Fourteenth Amendment
rights. 3 Finally, Congress passed the first incarnation of the bankruptcy
laws in 1800-68 years before the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified.'39 As one court has observed, it seems "logically inescapable"
that Congress, in passing the 1994 Act, exercised the same specifically
enumerated Article I bankruptcy power that it relied on in passing the
earliest versions of the Act.
140
Following this analysis, most courts that have considered the
constitutionality of § 106(a) have determined that the section is
invalid.' 4' At least one court has found it to be validly enacted under the
privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 42
However, most courts have ruled that § 106(a) cannot function as a
limitation on state's assertions of sovereign immunity in bankruptcy
proceedings.143
B. Although States Can Waive Their Immunity to Adversary
Proceedings, They Often Do Not
Because so many courts have found § 106(a) to be invalid, the only
remaining way of overcoming state sovereign immunity is by showing
that the state has waived its immunity expressly and voluntarily. States
need not waive their immunity in bankruptcy proceedings, however. As a
136. See Schlossberg v. Comptroller of Treasury (In re Creative Goldsmiths), 119 F.3d 1140,
1146 (4th Cir. 1997).
137. In re Fernandez, 123 F.3d at 245.
138. Id.
139. In re Creative Goldsmiths, 119 F.3d at 1146.
140. Id.
141. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
142. See In re Willis, 230 B.R. 619 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1999) (relying on the district court's
analysis in Wyoming Department of Transportation v. Straight, 209 B.R. 540 (D. Wyo. 1997)). But
see In re Straight, 248 B.R. 403, 415 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2000) (noting that since the lower court's
decision, Seminole and other Supreme Court decisions had established that its constitutional analysis
was incorrect and that § 106(a) is unconstitutional).
143. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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result, waiver is seldom effective to resolve the difficulties presented by
the existence of sovereign immunity. 44
The test for determining whether a state has waived its immunity from
federal court jurisdiction is an extremely stringent one.14 A state is
deemed to have waived its immunity only when its waiver is stated "by
the most express language or by such overwhelming implication.., as
will leave no room for any other reasonable construction."'46 Most
jurisdictions have held that a state may waive its immunity by invoking
the jurisdiction of a court in certain circumstances-by initially
defending a discharge proceeding on the merits, 47 for example, or by
filing a proof of claim against a debtor's estate.'48
However, this kind of waiver will not occur in all bankruptcy
proceedings. If the debtor's estate has assets remaining, a state may
decide to file a proof of claim in order to show its entitlement to a
portion of the remaining assets.'49 In a case where the debtor has no
significant assets, however, there is no reason for the state to file a proof
of claim. Rather, the state may simply choose not to participate actively
in the bankruptcy proceedings, instead responding to a debtor's
adversary proceeding by asserting sovereign immunity. Once that
assertion is made, the court no longer has jurisdiction over the state, and
the debt will remain undischarged 50
Ideally, states would pass statutes that would routinely waive their
immunity in bankruptcy proceedings in order to expedite the process.
However, states have an obvious financial interest in avoiding the trouble
and expense of adversary proceedings whenever possible and,
consequently, are more likely to engage in the proceedings only when
necessary to protect their interests.' Although one commentator has
suggested various ways to encourage states to participate, 52 states have
144. For a useful discussion of waiver issues in sovereign immunity in bankruptcy, see generally
Bartell, supra note 5.
145. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,241 (1985).
146. Id. at 239-40.
147. Hill v. Blind Indus. & Servs. of Md., 179 F.3d 754,757 (9th Cir. 1999).
148. Cal. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Jackson (In re Jackson), 184 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 1999).
149. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 103, at 455.
150. See Bartell, supra note 5, at 40.
151. Id. at 81.
152. See generally id. (noting that possible methods include use of the spending power,
conditional regulation, and manipulating the bankruptcy code to provide incentives for states to
participate).
529
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very little incentive to do so. As a result, sovereign immunity will
continue to pose difficulties in bankruptcy proceedings.
IV. THE "UNIFORM LAWS" THEORY SUGGESTS THAT STATES
RELINQUISHED THEIR SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN
BANKRUPTCY AS PART OF THE PLAN OF THE
CONSTITUTION
A theory based on states' implied waiver of sovereign immunity has
recently gained some degree of acceptance. Originally developed by
attorney Leonard H. Gerson, this "uniform laws" theory has been
adopted by a bankruptcy court in the Ninth Circuit and by the
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Sixth Circuit. 53 Courts adopting the
theory assert that the wording of the Constitution's Bankruptcy Clause
suggests that states waived their sovereign immunity in bankruptcy as
part of the constitutional plan, and therefore that there is no need for
Congress to abrogate an immunity that, by the terms of the Constitution,
no longer exists.
A. Development and Adoption of the "Uniform Laws" Theory
The "uniform laws" theory was originally proposed by bankruptcy
attorney Leonard H. Gerson in a law review article."5 4 Two courts have
adopted the theory as an attractive alternative to honoring a state's
immunity in discharge proceedings, and those opinions have been
appealed to the Sixth and Ninth Circuits. Gerson himself has represented
the Business Bankruptcy Law Committee before a number of Circuit
Courts of Appeal as an amicus curiae supporting the constitutionality of
§ 106(a).' 55 Gerson's theory has been used in a number of cases by
parties attempting to counteract states' assertions of sovereign immunity
and has been adopted by courts in both the Sixth and Ninth Circuits.
5 6
153. Hood v. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. (In re Hood), 262 B.R. 412 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2001);
Bliemeister v. Indus. Comm'n of Ariz. (In re Bliemeister), 251 B.R. 383 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2000).
154. Leonard H. Gerson, A Bankruptcy Exception to Eleventh Amendment Immunity: Limiting the
Seminole Tribe Doctrine, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (2000).
155. Id. at I n.*.
156. Gerson's theory was first taken up by an Arizona Bankruptcy Court in Bliemeister v.
Industrial Commission of Arizona (In re Bliemeister), 251 B.R. 383 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2000), and
more recently adopted by the Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in Hood v. Tennessee
Student Assistance Corp. (In re Hood), 262 B.R. 412 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2001). Both cases are currently
on appeal: In re Bliemeister to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit, and In re Hood
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B. Legal Argument Presented by the "Uniform Laws" Theory
The In re Bliemeister and In re Hood courts followed an analytic
process similar to that suggested by Leonard Gerson in his law review
article.'57 First, the courts noted that the "sovereignty" of the states
derives from the structure of the original Constitution.'58 As a result, the
question before the court was whether the original Constitution was
intended to preserve states' "sovereignty" over the subject of
bankruptcies.'59 The courts looked to Federalist No. 81, which notes that
states retain their immunity except as altered by the "plan of
convention," and Federalist No. 32, for a discussion of how state
sovereignty can be ceded under that plan. 6 ' In Federalist No. 32,
Hamilton presents the Naturalization Clause as an example of an area in
the Constitution where states relinquish their sovereignty.'6 ' Because the
naturalization and bankruptcy powers are set forth in the same clause
with similar language, the courts concluded that states also relinquished
their sovereign powers in bankruptcy under the Constitution.
Consequently, sovereign immunity, one of the traditional attributes of
sovereignty, must also have been ceded by the states.'63 Finally, because
the "uniform laws" theory establishes that states waived their sovereign
immunity when they ratified the Constitution, the theory permits courts
to avoid the question of whether § 106(a) is constitutional."M
The In re Hood and In re Bliemeister courts noted that states'
sovereign immunity is a fundamental aspect of their sovereignty as it
to the full Sixth Circuit Although the theory was also adopted in two other decisions, Nelson v. La
Crosse County Dist. Attorney (In re Nelson), 254 B.R. 436 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2000), and H.J.
Wilson Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue (In re Service Merchandise), 262 B.R. 738 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 2001), these opinions were reversed by higher courts. See H.J. Wilson Co. v. Commissioner of
Revenue (In re Serv. Merch.), 265 B.R. 917 (M.D. Tenn. 2001); La Crosse County Dist. Attorney v.
Nelson (In re Nelson), 258 B.R. 374 (W.D. Wis. 2001). In re Service Merchandise indicates how
controversial the theory continues to be. There, the district court found that state sovereign immunity
applied in banlruptcy proceedings, thus declining to follow the Sixth Circuit's earlier and
theoretically binding decision adopting the "uniform laws" theory in In re Hood! Id. at 92 1.
157. Gerson, supra note 154.
158. See In re Hood, 262 B.R. at 415; In re Bliemeister, 251 B.R. at 387.
159. See In re Bliemeister, 251 B.R. at 387.
160. Seeid. at388.
161. Seeid. at389.
162. In re Hood, 262 B.R. at 418; In re Bliemeister, 251 B.1R at 389.
163. See In re Hood, 262 B.R. at 428.
164. In re Bliemeister, 251 B.R at 391-92.
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existed before the passage of the Constitution and that they continue to
exercise that sovereignty except insofar as it was altered by the plan of
the Constitutional Convention."' The fundamental question, then, is
whether the plan of the Convention envisioned the preservation of states'
sovereign immunity in bankruptcy. 66 To determine what the framers of
the Constitution intended with respect to sovereign immunity, these
courts followed the Supreme Court in looking to Alexander Hamilton's
Federalist Papers.1 6
7
The courts began their textual analysis with an examination of The
Federalist No. 81. In this essay, Alexander Hamilton responded to his
readers' fears that states' sovereign immunity might be destroyed under
the new Constitution:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the
suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense
and the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of
the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of
every state in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of
this immunity in the plan of convention, it will remain with the
States, and the danger intimated must be merely ideal. The
circumstances which are necessary to produce an alienation of State
sovereignty were discussed in considering the article of taxation,
and need not be repeated here. 6 '
States' sovereign immunity survives, then, unless it has been
specifically surrendered in the "plan of convention"-that is, in the
Constitution developed by the Constitutional Convention. The
circumstances under which that surrender might occur are described in
Federalist No. 32, the "article of taxation.". 69
The Federalist No. 32 examines the limitations on state sovereignty as
they are expressed in the Constitution's Naturalization Clause. In this
"article of taxation," Hamilton is primarily concerned with describing the
distribution of taxing power between the federal and state
165. In re Hood, 262 B.R. at 415; In re Bliemeister, 251 B.R. at 388 (citing Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706, 734 (1999)).
166. In reHood, 262 B.R. at 416.
167. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.706, 716 (1999) (determining that states' sovereign immunity
included immunity from suit in their own courts and citing Hamilton's essays, describing him as one
of the Constitution's "leading advocates").
168. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 529-30 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modem Library ed., 1937).
169. THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 193 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modem Library ed., 1937).
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governments. 7 ' In the process, he discusses the circumstances under
which state sovereignty might be limited by various constitutional
provisions, specifically by the Naturalization Clause:
[T]he State governments would clearly retain all the rights of
sovereignty which they before had, and which were not, by that act,
exclusively delegated to the United States. This exclusive
delegation, or rather this alienation, of State sovereignty,
would ... exist... [among other cases] where it granted an
authority to the Union, to which a similar authority in the States
would be absolutely and totally contradictory and
repugnant ... [for example,] in that clause which declares that
Congress shall have power "to establish an UNIFORM RULE of
naturalization throughout the United States." This must necessarily
be exclusive; because if each State had power to prescribe a
DISTINCT RULE, there could not be a UNIFORM RULE.'7 '
Hamilton obviously has a point: in legislating naturalization, any
power-sharing between state and federal authority would produce
nonsensical results. The federal system allows citizens of one state to
easily move to another state; consequently, whichever state produced the
most lenient rule for naturalization would be legislating a de facto
naturalization standard for the entire country. Such a result would indeed
be "contradictory and repugnant" to national authority.
According to the "uniform laws" theory, the limitations on states'
sovereignty in naturalization also apply to bankruptcy. The courts note
that the same clause quoted by Hamilton 72 also establishes Congress's
Article I bankruptcy authority, granting Congress the power "[t]o
establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the
subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States."173  The
implication, the courts suggest, is unmistakable: the "contradictory and
repugnant" authority of the states that is foreclosed in naturalization is
foreclosed in bankruptcy as well. 74 Congress is allowed to establish "an
170. Id.
171. Id. at 194-95 (emphasis in original).
172. Id.
173. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
174. Hood v. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. (In re Hood), 262 B.R. 412, 418 (B.A.P. 6th Cir.
2001); Bliemeister v. Indus. Comm'n of Ariz. (In re Bliemeister), 251 B.R. 383, 389-90 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 2000).
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uniform Rule" for naturalization, and "uniform laws" for bankruptcy.'75
Thus, the states must have agreed to surrender their sovereign powers in
bankruptcy if Congress chose to act in that sphere. As one of the
traditional sovereign powers, sovereign immunity is presumably
surrendered as well.'
By positing bankruptcy as a special exception, the courts adopting the
"uniform laws" theory attempt to sidestep earlier, otherwise precedential
decisions that allow sovereign immunity to be asserted in bankruptcy.
Recent Supreme Court decisions like Seminole have forbidden
congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity under its Article I
powers, but the lower courts suggest that bankruptcy's unique placement
in the Constitution means that it, like naturalization, is an exception to
this rule.'78 Similarly, under the lower courts' analysis, Congress did not
need to adopt § 106(a) because states' sovereign immunity had been
abrogated in the original Constitution.'79 Consequently, other courts'
determinations of § 106(a)'s unconstitutionality are simply not relevant
and can be ignored.
V. THE "UNIFORM LAWS" THEORY IGNORES BINDING
PRECEDENT, IS BASED UPON ERRONEOUS LEGAL
REASONING, AND FAILS TO MAKE COMPELLING POLICY
ARGUMENTS FOR ITS ADOPTION
The "uniform laws" theory is profoundly flawed on a number of
levels. First, its adoption requires courts to improperly ignore a
considerable body of binding Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence by the
Supreme Court'80 and to deviate from a number of persuasive opinions
175. See supra note 173.
176. In re Hood, 262 B.R. at 418; In re Bliemeister, 251 B.R. at 389-90.
177. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146
(1993).
178. See In re Hood, 262 B.R. at 419.
179. Id. at 426; In re Bliemeister, 251 B.R. at 391-92.
180. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (examining ADA, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12,111-12,117 (1990)); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (examining
ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1967)); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (examining FLSA,
Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1994)); Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (examining TRCA, Pub. L No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567 (1999));
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (examining
Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a) (1992)).
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by lower courts.'5 ' Second, the theory is founded on an erroneous
understanding of the distinction between "sovereignty" and "sovereign
immunity." Courts adopting the theory's analysis misinterpret the
Federalist's discussion of "sovereignty," arguing as though it refers to
sovereign immunity' and misrepresent early attitudes about the
importance of retaining states' immunity under the Constitution.'83
Finally, the theory bases its arguments on a spurious policy justification
of "uniformity," incorrectly asserting that the "uniform laws"
requirement of the Constitution cannot be achieved if states' immunity
remains in play.'84
A. Courts Adopting the "Uniform Laws" Theory Improperly Ignore
Precedent Establishing That Congress Cannot Abrogate Sovereign
Immunity Under Any of Its Article I Powers, Including Bankruptcy
In order to adopt the "uniform laws" theory, courts must find that
bankruptcy is an exception to the Eleventh Amendment interpretations
set forth by Seminole and its progeny. However, the Supreme Court's
decisions allowing immunity in other Article I legislation apply just as
strongly in the bankruptcy context. Furthermore, a number of circuits
have explicitly examined and rejected the "uniform laws" theory.
Consequently, the In re Hood and In re Bliemeister courts' disregard of
these binding precedents is improper.
Courts adopting the "uniform laws" theory argue that the Supreme
Court's Eleventh Amendment precedents do not apply in the area of
bankruptcy law. The In re Hood and In re Bliemeister courts describe
bankruptcy as a wide-open field in sovereign immunity jurisprudence,'85
with the In re Bliemeister court going so far as to assert that "neither the
Ninth Circuit nor the Supreme Court has yet determined in the post-
Seminole era... whether the Eleventh Amendment preserved states'
181. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Mitchell), 209 F.3d 1111, 1121 (9th Cir.
2000); Sacred Heart Hasp. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare (In re Sacred Heart Hasp.), 133 F.3d 237, 245
(3d Cir. 1998); Dep't of Transp. & Dev. v. PNL Asset Mgmt. Co. (In re Fernandez), 123 F.3d 241,
245 (5th Cir. 1997); Schlossberg v. Comptroller of Treasury (In re Creative Goldsmiths), 119 F.3d
1140, 1147 (4th Cir. 1997).
182. See, eg., In re Hood, 262 B.R at 414; In re Bliemeister, 251 B.R. at 391.
183. See infra text accompanying notes 213-15.
184. See infra Section V.C.
185. In re Hood, 262 B.R. at 425; In re Bliemeister, 251 B.R. at 386.
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sovereignty over the subject of bankruptcies."'' 6 Because the Supreme
Court has not directly addressed the unique constitutional status of
sovereign immunity in the bankruptcy context, these courts reason,
previous rulings against Congressional abrogation of sovereign immunity
under Article I do not apply in this sphere."8 7 As a result, any earlier
generalizations about Article I powers must be considered dicta in the
bankruptcy context.
However, the Supreme Court's rulings on the Eleventh Amendment
must be considered as binding on courts adjudicating bankruptcy issues
as in all other Article I legislation. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in
Seminole that the binding rulings of the Supreme Court include not only
the bare holding of its opinions, but also all processes of reasoning
necessary to reach those holdings.188 The holding in Seminole could
conceivably have been reached without finding that all of Congress's
Article I powers are ineffective in abrogating state immunity; in this
particular case, the "uniform laws" courts may be correct in reading the
Court's assertions as dicta. However, in later cases, the Court took a
blanket prohibition on Article I abrogation as a given. In these cases, the
Court's analysis found that the statutes in question were enacted under
Article I; once that finding was reached, the Court ruled that, as a result,
the abrogation in those statutes was ineffective.8 9 Consequently, the
holdings of these later cases are completely illogical unless the Court has
created a blanket Article I ban. Under Rehnquist's Seminole rule,190 this
ban on Congress's ability to abrogate sovereign immunity in Article I is a
necessary predicate to the final holding of these cases, and thus is as
binding as the holdings themselves. There is a clear indication, then, that
when the Supreme Court says "all Article I powers," they in fact mean
all Article I powers, including the bankruptcy power.
Most lower courts have also found that bankruptcy is not an exception
to the Seminole rule. Even if lower courts accept the In re Bliemeister
and In re Hood contention that the Supreme Court has not explicitly
addressed bankruptcy, various circuit courts have considered and
186. In re Bliemeister, 251 B.R. at 386.
187. In re Hood, 262 B.R. at 425; In re Bliemeister, 251 B.R. at 386.
188. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,67 (1996).
189. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001); Kimel v. Fla.
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say.
Bank, 527 U.S. 627,635-36 (1999).
190. Seminole, 517 U.S. at 67.
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rejected the "uniform laws" theory, 9' including the In re Bliemeister
court's own Ninth Circuit. In Mitchell v. Franchise Tax Board (In re
Mitchell),'92 the court was primarily concerned with determining the
constitutionality of § 106(a), and found that it was not, in fact,
constitutional. Although the court did not directly cite Gerson's article, it
did specify that "there is no policy-based exception-such as national
uniformity-to the Seminole Tribe rule," 193 citing to Seminole and,
significantly, to the Fourth Circuit's explicit rejection of the "uniform
laws" theory in In re Creative Goldsmiths. 4 As a result, the weight of
precedential opinion alone would suggest that the "uniform laws" theory
should be rejected.
The In re Hood and In re Bliemeister courts found that bankruptcy's
inclusion in the "uniform laws" clause makes it a special case and that,
therefore, precedential decisions by higher courts did not apply. This
argument is unconvincing given that a number of those higher courts
have considered and rejected the "uniform laws" theory. However, even
if these courts were correct in discounting earlier precedent, the "uniform
laws" analysis is still built on legally erroneous foundations.
B. Courts Adopting the "Uniform Laws" Theory Err by Ignoring the
Distinction Between "Sovereignty" and "Sovereign Immunity"
The "uniform laws" theory is based on a profound confusion about the
distinction between "sovereignty" and "sovereign immunity." Although
"sovereign immunity" is traditionally one of the attributes of
"sovereignty," the two concepts are quite distinct. In the Federalist
Papers, Hamilton addresses a number of ways in which states'
lawmaking powers will be limited, while simultaneously assuring his
readers that states' sovereign immunity will be protected. However,
courts adopting this theory take Hamilton's comments on state
sovereignty and read them as applying equally to sovereign immunity.
They also fail to note significant historical evidence showing that the
framers of the Constitution placed considerable emphasis on the
191. See, ag., Mitchell v. Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Mitchell), 209 F.3d 1111, 1119 (9th Cir.
2000); Dep't of Transp. & Dev. v. PNL Asset Mgmt. Co. (In re Fernandez), 123 F.3d 241,244 (5th
Cir. 1997); Schlossberg v. Comptroller of Treasury (In re Creative Goldsmiths), 119 F.3d 1140,
1145-46 (4th Cir. 1997).
192. 209 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2000).
193. Id. at 1119.
194. Id. (citingIn re Creative Goldsmiths, 119 F.3d at 1145-46).
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importance of sovereign immunity and their reassurances to their
constituents that that immunity would not be limited by the constitutional
plan.
States' "sovereignty" is a concept that both encompasses and is
distinct from states' "sovereign immunity." Although immunity is one of
the traditional attributes of the sovereign, the two concepts are not
interchangeable. In Alden v. Maine,95 cited by both the In re Hood and
In re Bliemeister courts as foundational to their "uniform law" analysis,
the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the "authority and dignity" aspects of
state sovereignty.'96 According to the Court, "authority" represents the
sovereign's power to make and enforce laws in its domains, and
"dignity" refers to the sovereign's immunity from the indignity of being
served with process and ordered to appear before a court.'97 This
distinction becomes clearer with an example from international law. A
sovereign foreign nation (for example, Japan) retains a certain degree of
sovereign immunity in the United States court system. Traditionally, it
would not have been subject to suit without its consent.'98 However, to
say that Japan has sovereign immunity in the United States and to say
that Japan has sovereignty in the United States are two very different
things: Japan retains the "dignity" of sovereign immunity, but does not
take on other attributes of sovereignty-most notably, the "authority" to
make and enforce laws.
Courts adopting the "uniform laws" theory err by conflating these two
concepts. First, these courts misread Hamilton's Federalist text,
substituting "sovereign immunity" for "sovereignty" and vice versa,
despite clear indications that Hamilton was drawing distinctions between
the two. 9 9 Secondly, these courts ignore evidence from constitutional
history that indicates that the framers of the Constitution saw these two
terms very differently, providing for the necessary concession of some
state sovereignty while indicating that state sovereign immunity would
continue to be protected.200
195. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
196. Id. at 715.
197. Id.
198. See E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Modern Status of the Rules as to Immunity of Foreign
Sovereign from Suit in Federal or State Courts, § 4,25 A.L. 3d 332 (1969).
199. See infra text accompanying notes 210-212.
200. See infra text accompanying notes 213-215.
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The courts' analysis of Hamilton's Federalist essays profoundly
misunderstands the import of the test. Federalist No. 32 refers
specifically to the "authority" of the states, and how that "authority" can
be relinquished within the plan of the Constitution.20 ' Hamilton's
examples of how that authority might be transferred make it clearer that
he is speaking about the distribution of lawmaking powers between the
states and the federal government, i.e., sovereignty.2 2 The passage from
Federalist No. 81,203 however, is referring solely to sovereign
immunity-the "dignity" aspect described in Alden.2 4 Although No. 81
points the reader to No. 32 for a discussion of how immunity might be
given up by the states,2 5 it most certainly does not assert that that
immunity has been or will be given up under the plan of the
convention-to the contrary, in No. 81 Hamilton reassures states that
their prized immunity will not be impinged upon.2 6 In Federalist No. 32,
Hamilton had laid out the plan of the Constitution, noting that states
clearly gave up their sovereign authority over many areas: regulation of
foreign trade,20 7 establishment of patents,0 s and many others, including
banrrupty.20 9 But, as in the example of Japan, the authority to legislate
is not coequal with the privilege of immunity from suit, and the states'
inability to legislate in those specified areas does not in any way affect
their ability to assert their sovereign immunity, even in areas where they
have relinquished their sovereignty in other ways.
Courts adopting the uniform laws theory shade over this distinction
when analyzing the Federalist text, and confuse the "authority" of
sovereignty with the "dignity" of sovereign immunity. In In re Hood, the
court went through its analysis and concluded that states do not retain
their "sovereignty" in bankruptcy.210 Similarly, the In re Bliemeister
court performed an extensive analysis of the history of pre-constitutional
state lawmaking and concluded that states' "sovereignty" over
201. THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 194 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modem Library ed., 1937).
202. Id.
203. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 529-30 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modem Library ed., 1937).
204. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,715 (1999).
205. THE FEDERALISr No. 81, at 530 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modem Library ed., 1937).
206. See id.
207. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
208. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
209. U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 4.
210. Hood v. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. (In re Hood), 262 B.R. 412, 414 (B.A.P. 6th Cir.
2001).
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bankruptcy was surrendered under the Constitution.2 ' However, the fact
that states' "sovereignty"--their authority to legislate in a particular
matter-has been pre-empted by the Constitution does not mean that
their immunity has also been eliminated. If this were true, states would
lose their immunity in any area where Congress was given exclusive
power, and the Supreme Court's recent sovereign immunity decisions
would be constitutionally unfounded." 2 Such is not the case.
In order to sustain their amalgamation of sovereignty and sovereign
immunity, the In re Hood and In re Bliemeister courts also ignored
significant evidence showing that the framers of the Constitution valued
states' sovereign immunity and were determined to protect it. Evidence
exists showing that the framers of the Constitution had no intention of
limiting states' sovereign immunity to suits by individuals, and even
went to some trouble to reassure states that this kind of immunity would
remain completely intact. The retention of sovereign immunity under the
Constitution was an issue of vital interest to state legislators, and
members of the Constitutional Convention addressed the constitutional
ratification conventions of the various states in order to reassure them on
the subject."3 James Madison spoke to the Virginia ratifying convention,
noting that:
[the Supreme Court's] jurisdiction in controversies between a state
and citizens of another state is much objected to, and perhaps
without reason. It is not in the power of individuals to call any state
into court. . . . It appears to me that this [clause] can have no
operation but this-to give a citizen a right to be heard in the
federal courts; and if a state should condescend to be a party, this
court may take cognizance of it.214
John Marshall, later to be appointed as Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, remarked that:
It is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power should be
dragged before a court. The intent is, to enable states to recover
claims of individuals residing in other states. I contend this
211. Bliemeister v. Indus. Comm'n of Ariz. (In re Bliemeister), 251 B.11 383, 391 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 2000).
212 See supra note 92.
213. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 716 (1999).
214. Id. at 717 (citing 3 THE DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 553 (Jonathan Elliot ed.,
2d ed. 1836-45) [hereinafler DEBATES]).
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construction is warranted by the words. But, say they, there will be
partiality in it if a state cannot be defendant. . . It is necessary to be
so, and cannot be avoided. I see a difficulty in making a state
defendant, which does not prevent it being plaintiff."5
Given this strong emphasis on the sanctity of state immunity set forth
by Hamilton and others, then, it seems highly unlikely that this immunity
would be abrogated by the Constitution, especially in the elliptical way
posited by the "uniform laws" theory.
C. Courts Adopting the "Uniform Laws" Theory Fail To Present an
Adequate Policy Argument for Uniformity Because a Bankruptcy
Law That Provides for Uniform, Nationwide Immunity Is a
"Uniform Law'"
Courts supporting the "uniform laws" theory justify abrogating states'
immunity by pointing to the desirability and consistency of having one
uniform bankruptcy law throughout the country. However, uniformity
can be reached either by passing bankruptcy laws in which sovereign
immunity is uniformly abrogated or by passing laws in which states'
immunity is uniformly upheld. The question of whether to allow
immunity ultimately comes down to a conflict of policies: on the one
hand, Congress's desire for a strong, flexible system that brings states
into its scope and, on the other hand, the fundamental importance of
sovereign immunity to the nation's federalist structure. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that the importance of sovereign immunity
trumps even the most powerful policy considerations, however, and
therefore the stronger arguments are in favor of maintaining immunity.
There is no strong policy reason to abrogate states' immunity in
bankruptcy law, because uniformity can be achieved with or without
immunity, as long as that immunity is uniformly available to all states.
At the time of the Constitutional Convention, "uniform laws" in
bankruptcy were considered necessary in order to provide for clarity and
consistency nationwide.216 However, sovereign immunity would not
interfere with this uniformity any more than it would interfere with the
nation-wide uniformity of copyright law or any other Article I
Congressional legislation. If states are uniformly immune from suit under
215. Id. at 718 (citing DEBATES, supra note 214, at 555-56).
216. In reBliemeister, 251 B.R. at 390.
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the bankruptcy statute, then the kind of geographical uniformity
contemplated by the Constitution is maintained, and debtors and
creditors alike can make decisions accordingly. A "uniform law" with
sovereign immunity included is no more chaotic or irregular than a
"uniform law" without an immunity provision.
Ultimately, the question of uniformity comes down to a matter of
conflicting policies, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly found that the
constitutional importance of sovereign immunity outweighs other policy
considerations. Certainly, Congress wants to craft a "complete and
effective bankruptcy system."2 7 However, the principle of sovereign
immunity is a fundamental principle of constitutional structure.218 The
tension between state and federal interests lies at the heart of the
Constitution, and the balance of power created by that document should
not be tampered with. However, these same kinds of policies have come
into conflict in each of the recent sovereign immunity cases decided by
the Supreme Court. The usefulness and power of the nation's intellectual
property system is certainly affected by states' power to appropriate
ideas without fear of a lawsuit, but the Court has held that Congress
cannot subject states to the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act without
their consent." 9 The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) express fundamental
notions about the importance of fairness and equality in employment,
and exempting states from their requirements puts an unfair burden on
those whom these legislative schemes are meant to protect. Nevertheless,
the Court has found that even these profoundly important interests are
insufficiently vital to outweigh the basic importance of sovereign
immunity 20
VI. CONCLUSION
Sovereign immunity represents the essential constitutional principle
that states cannot be subjected to suit without their consent. It existed as
part of the original sovereignty of the states before the ratification of the
Constitution and was incorporated in that document and reaffirmed by
217. United States v. Fox, 95 U.S. 670, 672 (1877).
218. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 715.
219. Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 691 (1999).
220. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000).
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the passage of the Eleventh Amendment. In recent years, the Supreme
Court has further strengthened the power of states' immunity by
forbidding Congressional abrogation under Article I and strictly
regulating abrogation under the Fourteenth Amendment.
However, sovereign immunity poses challenges to the underlying
purposes of the bankruptcy system. When states raise immunity as a
defense to adversary proceedings, it creates difficulties in the
administration of debtors' estates. Certain debts owed to a state may
become non-dischargeable and, thus, creditors and debtors may not be
able to get the speedy and fair resolution of conflicts that the bankruptcy
process is designed to provide. Attempts to address the problem of
sovereign immunity in bankruptcy have been largely unsuccessful on
constitutional grounds. Congress has attempted to abrogate states'
sovereign immunity in bankruptcy through legislation, most recently
through the passage of 11 U.S.C. § 106(a), but most courts have found
these attempts to be an unconstitutional abrogation under Article I.
Although states could voluntarily waive their immunity in bankruptcy,
they generally do not, so the problem remains.
Recently, however, a novel "uniform laws" argument has been
developed and adopted by some courts. According to this theory, the
Constitution's Bankruptcy Clause acts to waive states' immunity in the
bankruptcy realm. As a result, proponents argue, Congress does not need
to abrogate states' immunity in the Bankruptcy Code because their
immunity in this area ceased to exist when the Constitution was ratified.
However, the "uniform laws" theory is profoundly flawed. Courts
adopting its arguments ignore binding Supreme Court precedent,
improperly gloss over the distinction between "sovereignty" and
"sovereign immunity," and misrepresent the Constitutional framers'
views on the importance of states' immunity. By failing to consider the
uniform alternative of a federal law which universally allows for the
assertion of states' immunity, courts adopting the "uniform laws" theory
fail to give sufficient weight to sovereign immunity's profoundly
important place in the Constitution's balance of federal and state power.
Given these problems, the use of the "uniform laws" theory by some
courts to find a waiver of immunity in as vast an area of law as
bankruptcy is surely misguided.
The problem of sovereign immunity cannot be solved through
unconstitutional legislation. The "uniform laws" theory represents an
attempt to overcome some of the difficult policy issues presented by the
application of sovereign immunity in bankruptcy. These issues are
undeniably serious, and should be examined. However, a theory as
Washington Law Review Vol. 77:511, 2002
profoundly flawed as this one is not the answer to the bankruptcy
system's difficulties. As a result, barring further, constitutionally
legitimate legislation by Congress, the bankruptcy system must learn to
live with the reality of state sovereign immunity.
